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Abstract 
Smart grid, the next generation power grid, uses two-way electricity and data flow by 
integrating information and communication (ICT) infrastructure into its legacy system. 
This allows for a self-monitoring, self-healing, adaptive power grid environment that 
encourages distributed generation methods and user active participation. Due to the 
huge network complexity, combined with the benefits that smart grid features offer, 
there is a need for simulation environments that allow us to understand different aspects 
of the smart grid ecosystem. The most in-depth attempts use co-simulation frameworks 
combining both legacy and communication networks.   
 
However, due to the critical nature of the availability of power related services, this 
massive network of millions interconnected devices creates security concerns and 
vulnerabilities. This thesis comprehends a description of the smart grid infrastructure 
and the main simulation platforms that are being used to model its complex 
environment. Emphasis is given to security related issues, by providing an overview of 
the different cyber-attack modeling techniques that are used to understand and confront 
system and network vulnerabilities and threats. Finally, an analysis of both simulation 
and emulation platforms that attempted to model attacks against parts of a smart grid 
network, is been given. 
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1 Introduction 
Smart grid is a market term used to describe the act of modernization and evolution of 
the electrical power grid infrastructure, which did not experience major changes during 
the last century. This modernization process was achieved with the integration of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) components on top of the 
conventional power grid, that connect field devices, utilities, operators and end users. 
This intelligence layer enables full real-time view and remote control of the grid 
infrastructure and applications to emerge. 
 
 The legacy power grid system is isolated and based on large central generation plants, 
transmission and distribution centers that are one-way and do not efficiently inform end 
users and customers about their electricity consumption. Generation is highly dependent 
on conventional resources (thermal, nuclear, chemical) a concerning issue, mainly due 
to the environmental impact of burning fossil fuels and the waste of almost two-thirds 
of fueled energy. Equipment is checked and restored manually, and the protection of the 
systems is limited. Higher demands, lack of effective monitor and control of the 
subsystems, lack of capacity to meet future demands and the inability to support 
decentralized energy resources together with the technological advances in 
communication systems are the reasons that lead to modernization opportunities in the 
power grid infrastructure.  
 
Smart grid is the result of an effort to build a more robust, self-healing, more automated 
and human less, environmental friendly power grid infrastructure. There has been a 
dramatic change in how energy is generated, transmitted and consumed emphasizing in 
balance between generation and demands as well as moving from central to widely 
distributed generation concepts. The increasing demand of energy and the protection of 
electrical devices requires complete control of substations, in order to create a reliable 
system that can adapt to and withstand failures. ICT systems can achieve full 
monitoring and control of the power grid ecosystem by offering two-way 
communication link possibilities. 
 
This thesis contributes to the cyber-attack modeling domain in smart grid related 
scenarios. An analysis of the most notable co-simulation and emulation efforts is being 
given, along with custom scenario variations and possible attack extensions. The 
scenario structures follow known cyber-attack modeling technique patterns for a better 
understanding of their impacts. 
 
The structure of this thesis goes as follows: section 2 provides a detailed overview of 
the smart grid ecosystem, by describing its architecture and main concepts, its 
underlying control system, the communication networks and technologies that are 
integrated and how all these features interact. In section 3, the main security issues of 
smart grid are discussed, along with a brief reference to the main related security 
incidents. Issues concern both the control system and the advanced metering 
infrastructure. Section 4 describes the ways smart grid environments can be modeled. 
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Emphasis is given to co-simulation frameworks that use a combination of power and 
communication network model approach and emulation testbeds that mimic behavior of 
real devices and can be integrated into real networks. An overview of both simulators 
and emulators used in smart grid modeling scenarios is also being given. Section 5 
includes a descriptive report on the cyber-attack modeling techniques used in ICT, CPS 
and in smart grid environments. Choosing the most appropriate techniques can help in 
better modeling, understanding attacks and mitigating risks and threats. Finally, in 
section 6 an analysis of simulators and emulators used in smart grid scenarios is given, 
their attack modeling techniques and a brief description of tools used, aiming at finding 
the most appropriate techniques, compatible with a smart grid scenario. 
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2 Smart grid overview 
2.1 Smart grid main concepts 
The core of smart grid [7] is the combination of communication and power grid 
networks for increased awareness of the system which is now interconnected, a more 
efficient use of current assets as well as applications that can prove of great importance 
to transmission, distribution, generation and end user areas. 
 
Smart grid enables the distributed control and monitor of the systems along with the 
existing central oriented one, that can improve utility services quality.  
 
Supports intelligent automated delivery of energy and error correction minimizing 
outage possibilities and energy loss that can reduce the amount of work of system 
operators. 
 
It is also capable of facilitating generation of all sizes, alternative sources of energy and 
microgrids that can run independently a huge advantage to power management and 
environmental impact. Energy can be now stored, reused and fed back to the grid. 
 
End users can now be a part of the system optimization by using real time information 
that is given to them through smart meters and smart appliances, allowing them to 
manage their electricity consumption efficiently and manually by plug and play 
services. 
 
Concluding, the main goal of smart grid is a self-healing power grid system that can 
support energy and demand side management efficiency. The previous, constitute the 
idea of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) which can be further defined as real 
time automated metering and meter data management using Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) equipment and computational intelligence to 
process and distribute information accordingly. 
2.2 Smart grid architecture 
For a better grasp of the smart grid infrastructure several conceptual models [1] have 
been provided. These can be area, technical or utility-oriented models. NIST [3], [5] 
divides the smart grid into seven domains: power generation, transmission, distribution 
and customers, markets, operators and service providers. 
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Figure 1 NIST smart grid model, extracted from [3] 
2.2.1 Generation 
Power plants where electricity is generated through other forms of energy before fed 
into the grid. The main change in this domain is that the two-way flow of electricity 
allows for more efficient and environmental friendly power generation using multiple 
layers of distributed intelligent generation (DG). Using distributed energy resources 
(DER) that are often based on wind and solar energy we can now move on from the 
conventional centralized fossil-based generation to small scale distributed generation 
from alternative energy resources. This concept allows for many independent user-
based generators that can stand on their own or act together as a conventional scalable 
power plant that can be managed remotely. Smart generation also allows for energy 
storage, control and asset management, a solution to peak availability and demand 
problems. Despite the many obstacles that can appear smart grid envisions power 
generation highly distributed and mainly reliable on DERs. 
 
2.2.2 Transmission 
Generated power is stepped up to higher voltage and moved to the transmission grid and 
the transmission substations. Due to higher demands the system must support better 
performance and energy delivery. The use of communication networks and 
computational intelligence can improve optimal transmission power quality, capacity 
and stability of transmission lines.  
 
Substations are now able to remotely control and automate processes which provides 
great flexibility and a helping hand to transmission system operators. This is achieved 
through monitoring and measurement equipment such as: 
 
 Sensors that are used to detect common errors and failures in the power grid. Sensor 
networks can provide a real-time full overview of the electrical transmission system, 
perform state estimation and automate or suggest solutions to operators. 
 
Smart relays, meaning digital microprocessor protective relays that can replace classic 
relays and store data and provide error correction and remotely control electronic 
devices like switches.   
 
Widely distributed Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). PMUs measure and monitor 
system data in real time using GPS synchronization and provide an overview of the 
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power and network system. PMUs send collected data to the Phasor Data Concentrator 
(PDC) which displays it to operators. Along with the rest power grid protection and 
utility equipment are one of the most important tools for the protection of the grid 
infrastructure.  
 
Smart control centers collect data from sensors and PMUs and use different data 
analysis techniques in order to make them meaningful, visualize them and use them 
accordingly. Different management systems are used depending on whether the data are 
related to energy transmission flow, utility markets or renewable energy resources. 
 
2.2.3 Distribution 
This is the step where transmitted power is stepped down to medium voltages before 
finally reaching end users. Smart relays are also used here for measurement, recording 
and control of distribution substations. Distribution control rooms can now provide 
integrated management and visualization of power grid devices, outage management 
systems and smart meters. 
 
Smart meters are devices that are used to gather consumption data from end user 
devices. They register data such as power consumption and are able to connect and 
disconnect customers from the grid or sound an alarm in case of emergency. The smart 
metering concept (AMI) differs from traditional automatic meter reading (AMR) in that 
the former allows two-way information flow with the meter through communications 
networks. In this way recorded data can be sent back to utility centers for real time 
monitoring and control of user devices.  
 
Consumers can manage their energy consumption proactively with the use of smart 
meters. They can generate part of their own energy using home solar panels, view 
billing prices in real time and program their appliances to run when the price of 
electricity is relatively low. 
 
 
Figure 2 Traditional vs smart grid, extracted from [5], [7] 
 
2.3 DCS and SCADA system overview 
Supervisory control and data acquisition [10], [11] is the evolution of the modern ICS 
control systems. The interconnection of ICT and ICS components brought a transition to 
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a computer based, remotely accessible through CLI, GUI optimizing control and 
automation. 
 
General structure: Field devices distributed throughout the plant areas. These devices 
include: Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), that automate basic electrical 
hardware processes such as relays and switches, based on the sensors feedbacks. 
Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) which are microcontrollers placed in remote locations 
that collect analog and digital data and perform simple tasks, sending them back to 
control centers for storage and visualization. PLCs and RTUs can communicate with 
multiple intelligent electronic devices.  IEDs refer microprocessor-based controllers 
with sensors and actuators such as circuit breakers and protective relays that are used 
for smart metering and monitoring. These devices collect and send data to the control 
center through the communication links. The distributed nature throughout the system 
in levels of control is the main feature of DCSs. Field sites are usually connected with 
operation sites over wide area networks. 
 
The main part of SCADA systems is the control center where the collected data from 
the field devices are gathered, analyzed, generating reports and alarms if necessary. It 
consists of workstations and servers and Master Terminal Units (MTUs) that 
communicate, and control distributed remote processes of the field devices, the 
databases that store the gathered information and the human-machine interface (HMI) 
for a graphical display of alarms and reports, that helps the operators to monitor and 
control automated processes manually in case of emergency. HMI could be on 
workstations, laptops over WLAN or browser based. 
 ICT equipment is used to connect control centers with field devices and other networks 
through wired or wireless means. 
 
 
Figure 3 SCADA system overview, extracted from [10] 
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2.4 Communication networks in smart grid 
The main feature of the new generation smart grid infrastructure is the bidirectional 
communication links between the different parts of the grid [12], [13]. This is achieved 
with different communication technologies, wired or wireless, that generate and 
transmit data related to consumption, power flow and devices status, that are useful for 
analysis, control and monitor of the grid. The capability to access every element of the 
grid and remotely automate processes renders these networks an essential part of the 
smart grid infrastructure that however introduces the already know ICT vulnerabilities 
to the system such as safe data transfer and eavesdropping. 
 
Information that is exchanged in smart grids can be either from sensors and electrical 
devices to smart meters or from smart meters to utility services and vice versa. The 
former is suitable for the use of low power wireless communication technologies such 
as ZigBee and LoWPAN while in the latter cellular or Internet services can be used. 
2.4.1 End user/Customer 
These networks enable the communication of smart electric appliances with data centers 
and allow for a real-time consumption display as well as efficient energy management 
and automation. Depending on the size of the network, it can be divided to Home Area 
Network (HAN), that connects smart devices and appliances with the smart meter, 
Business Area Network (BAN) and Industrial Area Network (IAN) where the 
communication between hardware, software, servers and SCADA/DCS systems is 
supported. Neighborhood Area Networks (NAN) connect the customer networks with 
the utilities and the distribution domain. 
 
Technologies used: ZigBee, a wireless communication technology that is low power, 
low cost, has low data rate and complexity and is suitable for home network metering 
and energy management demand response. Smart appliances, smart thermostats and 
photovoltaic panels are example of the communicating devices, interconnected with a 
smart meter and collector nodes for gathering data. ZigBee low power consumption 
allows devices batteries to last for long periods of time. Bluetooth can provide an 
alternative solution of HAN devices connection. 
  
 Wi-Fi seems a good choice for the connection of a group of HANS or Business 
networks where a higher bandwidth with relatively low-cost is required, adding 
however security issues especially in wireless deployments. 
  
Mesh network topology that uses all nodes as relays that transmit data, a dynamic and 
self-healing type of network that can adapt easily to changes and failures will probably 
be highly adopted in these types of networks. Collector nodes communicate with 
utilities and utility premises through common communication technology mechanisms, 
including Demilitarized Zones (DMZ) in order to protect sensitive parts of the network. 
 
For Industrial Area Networks an alternative could be the Z-wave network technology, a 
wireless mesh network that uses lower radio frequencies. End User networks could also 
be connected to smart meters through Power Line Communications (PLC). There is 
direct communication with the smart meters therefore no further operational expenses. 
In a typical PLC scenario, data are transferred to data concentrators through powerlines 
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and subsequently forwarded to data centers through cellular networks. PLC networks 
are mostly suitable for densely populated urban areas or geographically dispersed wide 
area networks. 
 
Home or residential gateways interconnect electronic devices or act individually 
depending on their type. They are responsible for the security and the translation 
between private HANs and external IP based networks. 
2.4.2 Distribution grid 
Due to the change of the conventional power grids to modern ones and the increasing 
use of distributed energy resources (DER) distribution systems and their operators face 
significant changes. New requirements demand more human less, adapting of the 
distribution substations as well as automated monitor and control of loads. Distribution 
and transmission centers have legacy paths as well as new smart grid communication 
paths. 
 
Depending on the type of the interconnected devices and the geographical coverage 
distribution substation and control networks are divided to neighborhood, field area 
networks (NAN, FAN) and Wide Area Networks (WAN) that are further interconnected 
to a backhaul network that acts as an intermediate between networks and is responsible 
for the data collection, automation and control of the distribution process through wired 
or wireless technologies. Protocols that are or could be used for these types of networks 
are Wi-Fi ZigBee or WiMax. 
 
Another type is the distribution substation network, a local area network that connects 
the field devices with a distribution substation and consequently to the backhaul 
network. Information between field devices is exchanged through wired or wireless 
communication technologies called feeder networks. 
 
2.4.3 Cellular networks 
 
Another option for smart metering and monitoring is through already existing cellular 
networks (2G, 3G, LTE, WiMAX). They do not require additional operational costs and 
deployments and their range could be a good solution for wide area networks and the 
communication between smart meters and the utilities. Operational and maintenance 
costs, coverage and license spectrum are managed by the ISPs and different data rates 
can be chosen depending on the network demands. Their main problems are the 
congestion due to the large shared use of their services and their lack of availability 
under certain circumstances.  
 
WiMAX (World Interoperability for Microwave access) can be used as backhaul to 
increase the capacity of other wireless networks and overcome some of their limitations. 
Cellular networks are primarily used as backhaul networks between FANs and NANs. 
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2.4.4 Transmission grid 
The implementation of intelligent electronic devices in the generation and transmission 
subsystems, demand a communication between the substations and the central control 
systems. This allows for remote control and response to potential system problems 
during the transfer of electricity from generation to distribution substations (blackouts), 
that can be manually or automatically controlled by transmission system operators.  
 
The main technologies used are phasor networks which use Phasor Measurement Units 
(PMUs) for high accuracy metering and synchronization with GPS. These devices can 
be either independent or integrated into other devices or protective relays. They are the 
core of the Wide Area Management Systems (WAMS) networks and along with 
SCADA/DCS control and monitor the transmission power grid subsystem. Ethernet 
over synchronous optical networking is the main way of establishing a communication 
link between the transmission substations over the fiber-optic cables of the transmission 
lines. Where fiber-optic connections do not exist Power Line Carrier for high voltages 
provides an alternative solution. 
 
 
Figure 4 Communication networks in smart grid, extracted from [14] 
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Figure 5 Main communication standards, extracted from [15] 
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3 Security issues in smart grid 
The complexity of the smart grid, which depends on continuously increasing number of 
interconnected electronic devices, computers, software and communication 
technologies, form an attractive target that if compromised by an adversary could have 
devastating effects. Smart grid is recognized as one of the 18 critical infrastructure 
systems because it is used to control electricity that is required almost everywhere. 
Therefore, the main security goals are firstly human safety and secondly to maintain 
integrity and normal process operation. The critical nature of the grid applications adds 
constraints in terms of delay and data sensitivity. Disruptions could also cause failures 
or outages and simple solutions such as rebooting an application that work in IT 
environments aren’t acceptable. Security assessments on SCADA systems have 
identified many cyber security holes, some of them being exposed to the public. The 
level of automation in substations is constantly increasing, which can lead to more 
security issues. The deployment of communication technologies and components will 
also introduce significant risks due to the fact that power grid applications were not 
designed for an IT based environment. Some of the technologies used are already 
known while others are under development and security issues and vulnerabilities are 
currently being discovered. Smart grids’ dynamic architecture and size does not foster 
accurate security assessments, allowing potential attackers to act unpredictably. 
3.1 Smart grid vulnerabilities/attacks 
3.1.1 SCADA/EMS 
Many security assessments have been performed to monitor and control systems of the 
power grid by Test Bed programs the last decades, exposing a variety of vulnerabilities 
during the tests [11], [16], [19]. 
 
Vulnerabilities that could concern PLCs and RTUs and other ICS equipment are 
hardware trojans when supply vendors are not reliable. Eavesdropping, tamper and theft 
of data, modification of firmware and even physical destruction are some of their main 
functionalities. Furthermore, the replacement of these devices is from 15 to 20 years and 
leaves a technology implementation gap with the new ones. 
 
HMI vulnerabilities could cause complete loss of control or even physical destruction of 
components. These could be weaknesses in authentication mechanisms or even coding 
errors concerning message input validation that could cause buffer overflows.  
 
The constantly increasing level of automation can lead to security concerns to 
distribution and transmission substations. Automation is related to interconnected 
electronic devices, hardware and software and communication devices that allow the 
remote control of switches, circuit breakers, transformers, capacitors and other 
important electrical devices. Poor security configurations and lack of immediate 
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security patches from vendors could lead to unauthorized access. The consequences of 
vulnerability exploitation in this domain would cause a disruption of the power grid 
operations. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks can be performed by compromised nodes, 
flooding control centers or RTUs with messages to waste their resources. False data 
injection could lead to wrong control decisions based on retransmission or modification 
of messages. Malware infection, access through poor management of databases could 
also provide entry points for attackers. A compromised center could be a gateway for 
attacking other transmission grid components. 
 
3.1.2 AMI components 
 
Attacks on smart meters and other AMI devices concern with integrity and 
confidentiality and privacy information, as they transfer sensitive consumption related 
data. The great number of devices and their limited computational resources such as 
bandwidth and memory increase the number of entry points and the risks of a 
cyberattack [17], [18], [21], [22], [23]. 
 
Smart meters 
Jamming attacks, DoS like attacks that can be performed by a malicious node to prevent 
smart meters from connecting to nearby devices by occupying the communicating 
channel with noise and signals. Wireless signals are transmitted in open space and are 
susceptible to man in the middle and eavesdropping attacks, the unauthorized sniffing 
and real-time interception of customer data related to energy consumption and billing 
prices. Smart meter encryption mechanisms that could protect against these attacks are 
often simple pattern related and easily deciphered. False data injection attacks, by 
introducing arbitrary values in data measurements without being detected by the 
security mechanisms in order to deceive utility service providers. Remote connect and 
disconnect is a smart meter feature that can malicious users shut down customers 
meters, steal energy and even cause meter failures that result in fires. Smart meters are 
also vulnerable to replay attacks due to synchronization issues and delays between 
transmissions. After gaining access to a vulnerable network, capturing and analyzing 
transmitted data this attack can be used to redirect energy or even cause physical 
damage. Finally, the physical accessibility of AMI components renders them 
susceptible to side-channel attacks, cryptographic attacks which allow information to be 
extracted from devices’ power consumption and processing time. 
 
Home Gateways 
Home gateways, an interface that forwards consumption from smart meters and display 
them in householder devices, are also susceptible to eavesdropping and modification 
attacks.  
 
PMUs 
PMUs are vulnerable to cyberattacks if a node is compromised by an attacker. The 
attacker may be able to spoof host addresses or alter critical network messages, which 
could cause damage to transmission and distribution operations. 
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Communication networks 
Vulnerabilities come from different network sources such as enterprise firewalls that 
filter incoming network packets and monitor traffic, switches and routers and 
communication systems that transfer data between networks. 
The various network layers and the protocols that are adopted for data exchange could 
also provide potential entry points for attackers. Standard Internet Protocol Suite like 
TCP/IP or HTTP and common operating systems are being used between corporate and 
control domain inheriting their vulnerabilities. The Internet Control Center Protocol 
(ICCP), ModBus and its more efficient version the Distributed Network Protocol 3.0 
(DNP) are used for the communication between control centers (MTU) and field 
devices. These legacy communication protocols where built without security in mind 
and often come with poor configuration. Reverse engineering these protocols using their 
publicly available specifications could lead to possible vulnerability discovery and 
exploitation. 
 
Black hole and selective forwarding attacks that silently drop ingoing or outgoing 
traffic, have been demonstrated against the routing protocol for Low Power and Lossy 
Networks that HAN, NAN use. ZigBee and WiMAX networks often have encryption 
issues and can possibly be vulnerable to DoS and sniffing attacks. 
 
Finally, the human factor should always be considered as a security risk. Phishing E-
mails with malicious attachments and USB drives with malicious software have started 
some of the most sophisticated attacks. Security unaware people are highly related to 
the most known cybersecurity incidents. The main reasons for these kinds of incidents 
are insufficient training and poor security policies.  
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3.2 Incidents 
An attack known as Aurora was demonstrated by the Idaho National Lab. It caused 
explosion of a power generator after gaining access and infecting it with a virus 
program that turned switches on and off repeatedly, showing that equipment of the grid 
could be destroyed remotely by a cyberattack. 
 
A nuclear power generation plant was forced to shut down for two days. The reason 
was a software update that caused the rebooting of the computer monitoring system. 
The safety system translated wrongly the lack of monitoring information, shutting down 
the power plant, which cost millions of dollars to the company. 
 
Stuxnet, a worm that infected PLCs in Iran is one of the most known attacks in ICS 
systems. It got into the system via a USB flash drive using a rootkit to hide its presence. 
It replicated itself through the network due to unpatched vulnerabilities and instructed 
the victim computers to connect to a C&C server. The server then modified PLCs 
instructions that ruined thousands of centrifuges. 
 
Another known incident is the Ukraine power grid hack. It started with a spear-phishing 
campaign that targeted IT staff working in different electricity distribution companies in 
Ukraine. The mails contained a malicious word document that installed a backdoor to 
their corporate networks. After some months, they managed to gain access to the main 
controller and collect credentials that led them into the SCADA networks. After writing 
malicious firmware for serial-to-ethernet converters and replacing the legitimate one, 
they disabled the operators from sending remote commands. They launched a TDoS 
attack that prevented the workers from reporting the outage and they finally launched 
the attack by opening the breakers bringing several substations offline. 
 
A new campaign of attacks called Dragonfly 2.0, that targets energy companies has 
recently been revealed. Hackers gained access to control center interfaces that are 
responsible for sending commands to critical electronic devices. The intrusion was 
traced back to 2015 but escalated in mid-2017. Spear-phishing e-mails with malicious 
attachments targeting unsuspicious victims were the origin of the attacks. These 
attachments led to compromised websites infected with malware that stole credentials 
from victims which finally gave them operational access. 
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4 Simulation 
Modern smart grid systems must exchange large data volumes, integrate new features, 
cope with continuously increasing demands for electricity and be resistant against 
possible failures and cyberattacks. TCP/IP based communication and technologies will 
play an important role in smart grids development. This complex and dynamic 
infrastructure renders simulation frameworks essential for analysis, energy consumption 
estimation, performance and impact of ICT components on the networks. Simulation 
enables the evaluation of new architectures that are designed for the smart grid 
infrastructure before their actual deployment, minimizing risks and costs [24]-[27]. 
4.1 Categories 
Two main categories exist for test platform creation of cyber physical systems such as 
the smart grid. Real hardware testbeds and software simulation. Real hardware testbeds 
are further broken down into two categories: Full hardware platforms that offer a 
complete duplication of ICS hardware. The smart grid testbed in Koreas’ island Jeju and 
the renewable energy lab in Greece are some examples. The second category is 
Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulation that includes both real hardware components 
and simulated ones are used. At least one real hardware device is needed connected to 
modeling software to achieve a simulation loop process. This is the best scenario when 
all layers need to be modeled and full hardware approach is not available. 
 
Modeling smart grid involves different tools that belong to different domains. These 
tools are often written in different languages, incompatible and in need of a framework 
that supports diverse simulation technologies. To examine the co-existence of power 
and communication networks software approach is divided to individual and co-
simulation platforms. The former proposes the extension of an individual simulator to 
enable the simulation of communication networks providing a single integrated 
simulator, that focus on specific areas of interests, a non-effective solution if scenarios 
become too complex. The latter proposes the independent use of power and network 
simulators to form a time synchronized tool that can exchange data between simulators. 
 
The power grid network is modeled by one or more power simulators. The complexity 
of the network requires simulators that focus on specific domains (transmission, 
distribution etc.). Wired and wireless communication links, common protocols and 
control mechanisms are represented by a network simulator. Power grid simulators are 
usually time-driven, solving a set of equations in discrete small steps while network 
simulators are event-driven, performing action when something actually happens 
(packet send or receive, delays etc.) rather than in predetermined intervals. A 
synchronization mechanism is therefore required for the communication of the co-
simulation platform components. This mechanism acts as a middleware that exchanges 
time and data between the simulators in different ways, depending on the priorities 
given. Power system output becomes input for network and vice versa, with both 
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simulators stopping at predefined synchronization points in order to exchange 
information. 
 
 
Figure 6 time continuous simulation, extracted from [24] 
 
Figure 7 discrete event simulation, extracted from [24] 
4.2 Power grid simulators 
 
4.2.1 MATPOWER/PYPOWER 
 
Initially part of the PowerWeb project, it is a package for solving power flow and 
optimal power flow problems. Power (load) flow analysis is a non-linear solution that 
estimates real and re-active power based on known voltage and magnitude angle. 
Optimal power flow optimizes the process using specific constraints adjusting the 
power system control settings accordingly. Although MATPOWER is open source it 
comes as a MATLAB package which is a proprietary software. PYPOWER [28] is a 
translation of MATPOWER using python language and SimPy library. 
 
4.2.2 OpenDSS 
 
An open-source power system simulator by EPRI mainly designed for distribution 
utilities system simulation [30]. It is a well-suited platform for smart grid scenarios as it 
is easily extendable and supports analysis related to distributed generation and 
renewable energy resources. A flexible tool that provides interfaces for users to 
implement their own models. DSS performs frequency domain circuit analysis such as 
power flow, harmonics and dynamics. Example of DSS applications are wind 
generation and farms, PV modules and distribution automation and control. It can be 
run as a standalone program or as a process from a variety of existing software 
platforms. 
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4.2.3 GridLAB-D 
 
A smart grid distribution system simulator developed at U.S. Department of Energy that 
provides useful information regarding the role of distribution operators, utilities and 
markets [30]. It is a powerful power system simulator that can also be used to model 
end-user environments and distribution automation processes. GridLAB-D can simulate 
millions of interconnected devices efficiently and be easily extended with new modules. 
Modules are used to define classes that instantiate objects which are being monitored 
synchronized and updated during simulation process. It provides comprehensive tools 
for distributed energy resources and data collection for analysis, distribution level pow-
er flow and residential models, which makes it most appropriate for modernized grid 
scenarios. 
 
 
4.3 Network simulators 
 
4.3.1 OMNeT++ 
 
An open source, object oriented discrete event simulator for modeling wired and 
wireless network environments [32]. It has a basic structure and tools for simulations 
that make it a proper framework for generic simulation of any network and common 
communication protocols. Simulation models consist of reusable components called 
modules that can be connected together to form more complex ones and exchange 
information. Both Graphical and command-line user interfaces are available for most 
common operating systems. 
 
OMNeT++ active modules are named simple modules and are written in C++ language 
and can be group together to form a complex simulation network. Modules and 
messages are represented by C++ classes in OMNeT++ libraries. The generic model 
structure is written in OMNeT++’s NED language. Information that is exchanged 
between modules when simulating a communication network act as frames or packets 
and travel through simple and complex modules. Connections are used to model the 
physical links of the network including user or OMNeT++ defined objects related to 
data rate delays and errors. Parameter values and control flow of the simulation are 
usually stated in the configuration file. Simulation results can be saved externally or be 
analyzed through OMNeT++ IDE. 
 
4.3.2 Ns-3 
 
Ns-3 [31] is a discrete event network simulation platform mainly developed for 
educational purposes and experiments on Internet based environments. Despite its 
extensive focus on TCP/IP networks it can be also used for more generic modeling 
purposes. Ns-3 has a modular structure too, with a preference for command line tools. 
Its’ purely written in C++ language with Python bindings and supports simulation 
-20- 
scripts in both languages. It provides more detailed modeling features, allowing the 
modeling of Wi-Fi, cellular environments and many different routing protocols, it is 
maintained more actively than its previous version ns-2 and allows for pcap generation 
that can be used for further analysis. 
 
Ns-3 uses Mercurial as a source code management system and Waf for building the 
source code libraries. It is mainly designed for Linux like systems giving Windows 
users a choice between Cygwin or virtual like environments. 
 
4.4 Co-simulation approach 
 
4.4.1 OpenDSS/OMNeT++ co-simulation 
 
SGSim framework 
 
SGSim [33] is an open source smart grid co-simulation framework that uses OpenDSS 
for power grid simulation and OMNeT++ for communication network simulation. It 
also provides an interface for the integration of phasor data concentrators allowing the 
modeling and analysis of lower layer parts.  
 
OpenDSS runs a script that describes the power grid components and their 
interconnections. The COM interface is used to execute the script while the DSS solver 
is used to synchronize and connect OpenDSS with OMNeT++ components. The DSS 
solver is an OMNeT++ component that connects at certain intervals to the DSS process 
to synchronize the simulators 
.  
OMNeT++ is composed of devices like switches and batteries, distributed generation 
sources, sensors that are used to read data from different components and demand 
response applications that can be used to measure different data and perform control 
actions and changes through the COM interface. Simulated packets can also be 
forwarded to real software PDC components in a real-time simulation scenario. 
  
Because of the difference of the two simulators a DLL library is used to access the 
elements through the DSS COM interface and return their values to OMNeT++. The 
library provides a set of functions that set or change values in different elements of the 
power grid network. OMNeT++’s INET framework, a model library for wired wireless 
and mobile networks is used for communication networks components providing 
models for all OSI layers. 
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Figure 8 SGSim framework, extracted from [33] 
 
IIT Madras framework 
 
A generic co-simulation framework that also utilizes OpenDSS and OMNeT++ to ana-
lyze the performance of PMU based wide area monitoring with the use of smart grid 
applications [34]. A NASPInet based environment that includes the modeling of PMUs, 
PDCs, Phasor Gateways and their interconnection is being evaluated. The synchroniza-
tion is based on the electric power and communication synchronizing simulator 
(EPOCHS) approach. 
 
OpenDSS scripts are used to define and solve circuits, while modifying parameters at 
run-time and export their results to files represents the actions of PMUs. A Visual C++ 
library is used to provide the interface between the two simulators. OMNeT++’s net-
work is composed of PMUs that forward data to PDCs, PGs, control centers and then 
through the DSS solver to OpenDSS. 
  
EPOCHS uses a Real-time-infrastructure (RTI) package that takes control of the system 
at certain intervals to exchange information between the simulators. This approach has 
to deal with two main problems, fault detection and resolution that are being solved by 
the controller module of OMNeT++. 
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Figure 9 IIT Madras framework [34] 
 
PEVs reactive control framework 
 
An OpenDSS and OMNeT++ co-simulator used to evaluate a reactive control algorithm 
with plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) in a distribution network environment [35]. The 
power network consists of a substation that steps down the transmission voltage to 
distribution levels, several residential networks that split and step the voltage further 
down to consumption levels, connected to nodes which correspond to customer 
households. The communication network consists of a converged fiber and wireless 
technology that splits to a wireless NAN and a wired or wireless broadband access 
network. 
 
The co-simulator includes two main components. The process that is used to connect 
the power and the communication networks. It runs in OMNeT++ and uses HTTP 
requests and responses to forward information back and forth to OpenDSS. The packets 
exchanged are related to PEV applications. HTTP is used because the power simulator 
and the merging co-simulation process run in different OS environments. 
 
4.4.2 FNCS framework 
 
Framework for network co-simulation (FNCS) [36] is a multi-domain co-simulation 
framework for the modeling of smart grid. It can be used for many smart grid 
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simulation scenarios, including transmission, distribution markets and communication 
network modeling scenarios. Like all co-simulation frameworks it is based on the re-use 
of already known and validated simulators. These simulators run on their own process 
and FNCS acts as a synchronization and interconnection middleware between them. It 
mainly uses GridLAB-D and MATPOWER for the power grid and ns-3 for the 
communication network simulation, integrating transmission, distribution and 
communication domains simultaneously.  
 
FNCS is programmed in C++ and provides an API for handling time management and 
intercommunication between the on-use simulators. FNCS core provides an interface 
(Integrator) that is responsible for handling the initialization and simulation steps 
between the different discrete-time and discrete-event simulation environments. It also 
provides an interface (ObjectCommInterface) for the simulator components that need to 
send messages and communicate with other simulators. 
 
Before each simulation step FNCS initializes all required properties for simulators and 
other time related dependencies. Two main methods are used for time management and 
synchronization, one at the beginning of each step to start the simulation and one at the 
end to get the time of the next step. Time management is important for on time and 
consistent exchange of messages without adding delays.  FNCS depends only on a 
networking library called ZeroMQ that deals with the sockets that carry all network 
related messages. Messages are buffered and exchanged during synchronization 
process.  
 
 
Figure 10 FNCS overview, extracted from [37] 
4.4.3 Mosaik 
 
An open source co-simulation framework that is used for the modeling of synchronized 
smart grid scenarios of already existing simulators and control strategies. Purely written 
in Python 3 mosaik [38], [39] is flexible in a way that it can be used to model a great 
number of different scenarios with most known simulators. It offers a language agnostic 
API (mosaik-core) which allows for these kind of simulation scenarios and handles 
synchronization and message exchange issues. As a standalone program mosaik is not 
useful so many free simulators and other helpful tools are provided to for simple 
simulation modeling. 
-24- 
 
Mosaik consists of four main components:  
The mosaik Sim API which handles the communication between mosaik-core and the 
simulators used. It is divided to low and high-level API. The former uses simple 
networks sockets to exchange messages between the simulators. The latter is the 
binding of the low-level API to a specific language. By default, mosaik offers Python 
and Java APIs. The low-level API allows the users to implement their own work in any 
other language. 
 
The scenario API allows the creation of simulation scenarios in Python. It includes 
simulators startup, modeling of the entities needed and their interconnection. 
 
The simulator manager is responsible for dealing with external simulation processes 
and connecting with them. This gives mosaik the advantage to integrate simulators, 
written in any language which will run in its own process. 
 
SimPy library, a discrete-event simulation framework written in Python. It is used for 
the synchronization and coordination of scenarios with simulators of different step 
sizes. 
 
 
Figure 11 mosaik features, extracted from [38] 
4.4.4 NeSSi2 
 
NeSSi2 [40] provides a security-oriented network simulator environment that can be 
used for IDS evaluation and efficiency. Its simulation features include common attack 
scenarios that can be used for research by network and security experts along with a 
GUI for real-time inspection and configuration. 
 
 NeSSi2 supports several TCP/IP standard protocols along with an implementation for 
application (HTTP etc.) network (IPv4, routing etc.) and transport layer with a pcap file 
format traffic generation. It is built on top of three framework models for simulation 
environment setup with security related configuration capabilities, simulation execution 
and evaluation of results. 
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Figure 12 NeSSi2 architecture, extracted from [40] 
 
NeSSi2 consists of three main components: the GUI that allows for the creation of drag 
and drop scenarios and visualization of simulation results, the simulation backend that 
refers to the machine which creates the network entities and security algorithms, 
connects with the database and executes the simulation. The database that stores 
network topology, traffic and detection data generated during the simulation and attack 
related events for further analysis. 
 
 
Figure 13 NeSSi2 GUI and backend 
 
NeSSi2 are composed of project folders that further include subfolders of networks, 
applications, profiles, scenarios and simulation parameters. Networks consist of nodes 
and edges and can be created and manipulated through the palette editor. Applications 
model behavior of nodes during the simulation and run separately both on backend and 
user interface in created JAR files. Applications are collected together into profiles to 
model the entire network behavior. Scenarios are instances of profiles that run on 
specific nodes in the network. The executable components in the user interface 
constitute the simulations. Simulation files handle the duration, recording configurations 
and node mappings between multiple network simulations. The GUI editor allows for 
visualization of recorded simulation statistics, simulation progress, properties and 
outline. 
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Figure 14 applications -> profiles -> scenarios -> simulations -> NeSSi2 project 
 
4.5 Emulation approach 
 
Besides co-simulation techniques for smart grid modeling, there are a few emulation 
based attempts to replicate smart grid environment subdomains and communication 
scenarios. Emulators mimic the original behavior of different components, usually 
operate at real-time, allow for external hardware and software integration and 
experiments. Network emulators differ from simulators in the way that they can be 
attached to hosts and be viewed as a real network would. This gives the potential for 
real-world scenario network tests using packet generation or other related software and 
penetration testing platforms. Two attempts to model cyber-attacks against smart grid 
networks have been made by a variation of the Core and the GNS3 network emulator. 
 
4.5.1 CORE 
 
The Common Open Research Emulator (CORE) [41] aims for the representation of 
virtualized computer networks that run in real time using standard applications and 
protocols. Its main goals are to provide an easy-to-use GUI, flexibility and scalability 
and modification capabilities and is commonly used for networks and security related 
scenario evaluation. 
 
Core runs on Linux based systems and is based on virtual node networks which are 
lightweight virtual machines that are built by daemons used to manage sessions between 
them. Core GUI uses Tcl programming on top of the standard Tk graphical user 
interface and communicates with the daemons through the API. The user may directly 
interact with scripts, CLI tools and the GUI. 
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Figure 15 CORE architecture, extracted from [41] 
 
The CORE GUI operates in two modes: Edit mode which provides drag and drop tools 
for network modeling and emulation instantiation and Execute mode where the tools 
aim mainly at interacting between the virtual nodes and in visualizing network traffic. 
Network configuration and traffic can be manual or automatically arranged. Both wired 
and wireless scenarios are supported. 
 
Core provides interfaces for connecting with physical devices, tunnel tools to interact 
with other emulations or virtual machines and may also communicate with the host 
machine that runs the emulation. Services run on core nodes to describe the processes 
running. 
 
4.5.2 GNS3 
 
GNS3 [42] is an open source network emulator that is used to configure real networks 
that range from small local topologies to multiple server hosted ones. GNS3 allows for 
real hardware device virtualization, initially started with cisco devices, now supports 
many devices from different network vendors as well as Linux, Windows and many 
other appliances that can be easily added, configured and integrated into its projects. 
 
GNS3 is composed of a client and server part that are made of two software 
components, the GNS3 all-in-one GUI, and the GNS3 VM. The GUI is the client part of 
GNS3 that can be used to graphically create and run network topologies. The server part 
of GNS3 is responsible for hosting and running the network devices and appliances 
created by the GUI client and can be configured to run in a few different ways. It can be 
run locally on the host that runs the all-in-one software or on a local/remote GNS3 VM 
through VMware software. For basic GNS3 topologies a local all-in-one installation 
that uses the Dynamips older technology is sufficient whereas VM is recommended for 
a more robust, advanced scenario that makes use of cisco VIRL images. 
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Figure 16 GNS3 GUI, VM and router console 
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5 Cyber-attack modeling 
techniques 
Cyber-attacks are a delicate issue in the world of cyber security that forces governments 
and organizations to spend a great amount of effort to detect and handle them, with the 
use of different tools and techniques keeping operations and services running at normal 
levels. New types of malware that are constantly emerging are of significant important 
to understand them in order to provide better system and network security. 
 
Attack modeling techniques [43]-[45] have been developed and used to find most 
common vulnerabilities and mitigate ongoing incidents that require instant response. 
Many researchers have been working on cyber-attack modeling and analysis providing 
their point of view on how to defend against potential threats. These techniques help in 
a better understanding of a victim network and its vulnerabilities as well as the 
attackers’ nature and their motives. Modeling an attack in advance helps in better 
handling and planning if it actually occurs, saving money and resources from potential 
victims. 
5.1 Attack Graphs/Trees 
Attack graphs [46]-[49] are tree-structured (with multilevel children and a single root) 
conceptual diagrams that examine how a target can be attacked. They are divided to 
four components: the root, which is the fundamental objective, leaf nodes that represent 
different paths through the attack model and logical AND and OR-nodes. They model 
different scenarios executed in systems that can lead to undesired and harmful states 
that are called failures. Failures are caused by malicious actions of adversaries that 
attack the system or network in order to gain unauthorized access, privileges or cause a 
deliberate disruption of services. Recent attack graph models are based on tools that 
provide a detailed representation of the system and network parameters, automated 
graph analysis and generation based on the modeled environment inputs, visualization 
and incident response strategies. 
 
The basic information that is needed to generate an attack model is included in the 
network model and is divided to host and attack action elements. Hosts are objects that 
are discovered to have been attacked by a malefactor. Attack actions include 
reconnaissance, preparatory, privilege escalation and confidentiality, integrity and 
availability compromise actions. In order to add a potential attack in the attack graph the 
required conditions are that the system or network has vulnerabilities and the adversary 
has enough knowledge and resources to perform the attack successfully. 
 
Attack graph methodologies that have been proposed by many researchers vary from 
Buchi 5-tuple automaton models that use acceptance condition and violations to 
generate attack graphs, hidden Markov models that explore the probabilistic nature 
between observation and actual states, two-layer or multi-layer graphs that combine 
vulnerability information and the topology of the network to model attacks, combining 
host and attack actions with objects of type route threat and graph to evaluate security 
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metrics and using logical expressions for automatic statistical analysis and 
countermeasures of attack paths. 
 
 
Figure 17 Attack tree conceptual model, extracted from [49] 
The main tool approaches for generating attack graphs are TVA (Topological 
Vulnerability Analysis), NETSPA (Network Security Planning Architecture) and 
MULVAL (Multihost, multistage Vulnerability Analysis). TVA uses graphs based on 
system and network condition before and after exploit are used combining their 
interdependencies to identify all possible attacks paths and remediation actions. TVA 
models network configuration, including scan reports and firewall rules, vulnerabilities 
and services, matching them against a modeled database of possible exploits indicating 
how attackers can penetrate a network. NETSPA aims to generate attack graphs 
searching through a possible attack space with a use of a simple description language. It 
also accepts network configuration, software, firewall and IDS information. An efficient 
tool that can be combined with other security components for network security analysis. 
MULVAL is a logic programming based network security analyzer. Information is also 
based on common vulnerability databases and network configurations and graphs are 
being generated based on the interaction between them. 
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Figure 18 Necessary information to create a graph model, extracted from [48] 
 
5.2 Attack Surface/Vector 
 
An attack vector [50] is a path or a set of tools, commands and events that a user can 
gain unauthorized access to a computer system or network. Examples include malicious 
email attachments and pop-up windows, chat rooms, vulnerable web pages or web 
pages with malicious content, and the human factor. Vectors refer more to the paths that 
allow attackers to land their attacks rather than the malware itself like viruses or other 
malware executables. 
Attack surface is the sum of the attack vectors that an adversary may use to attack a 
modeled environment. To visualize an attack surface model the first step is to map the 
topology of the targeted system or network. This includes servers, endpoints, network 
and security devices such as firewalls, VPNs and IDSs. The second step is to identify 
and map all the Indicators of Exposure (IOEs). IOEs can be found in all different entry 
and exit points such as UIs, APIs, databases, files from outside the network, emails, 
authentication, authorization, operational and monitoring interfaces. These include 
software vulnerabilities, and lack of proper input validation poor security mechanisms 
in control systems and security policy violations. An additional step that can be taken is 
discovering the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), forensic artifacts that indicate a 
computer intrusion, data collected from security logs and scanning tools like malware 
hashes and blacklisted IP addresses. The last step includes using the topology, the IOCs 
and the IOEs together to attain valuable security related information. 
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Figure 19 A sum of information security attack vectors, extracted from [51] 
 
5.3 OWASP and Threat Modeling Techniques 
 
 
OWASP an open community that focuses on application security, defines threat 
modeling as a procedure for optimizing security by identifying vulnerabilities and 
threats and providing the corresponding countermeasures and mitigations. It is a process 
that starts during the planning phase of an application development and runs throughout 
its lifecycle as new features are added. It is based on a generic process that, rather than 
searching for every possible threat and vulnerability, focuses on factors that have 
greater probability or impact if exploited.  
 
OWASP divides threat modeling [53] to a multi-step process that starts with the 
assessment scope which aims at identifying all tangible and intangible assets. The 
process goes on with the modeling of the system and with identifying all possible threat 
agents that can harm the system based on the data given and all the possible ways they 
can achieve it. The next few steps include a study of the vulnerabilities that can indeed 
be exploited and the already existing countermeasures. The process ends with an 
evaluated prioritization to reduce the risks to satisfactory levels. 
 
There are different organized techniques for threat analysis such as Threat Modeling 
Attack Paths (T-MAP), STRIDE and Petri-nets. Most of these require a thorough study 
of assets, entry points and data flow diagrams (DFDs) for a better understanding of the 
system. A DFD is a graphical representation of data in the system. Its main elements are 
the external entity, data flow, data store and processes. Flow diagrams are created in as 
many steps required. An alternative to DFDs are activity diagrams which focus on the 
workflow of the system. STRIDE is a reminder of Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, 
Denial of Service, Elevation of privilege and is used to identify these types of threats. 
  -33- 
STRIDE assumes that at least a DFD is present and is often used together with other 
threat modeling techniques. T-MAP is a quantitative threat modeling technique used for 
calculating the weights of possible attack paths. Attack paths include firewalls, 
commercial off the shelf systems and IT infrastructure. By calculating all weights, the 
overall threat is known. Petri-nets also known as p/t nets or places and transition nets 
propose an alternative technique. As the term implies, they consist of places or states, 
transitions and arcs that suggest changes in state of the modeled system. 
 
 
 
Figure 20 OWASP threat modeling, extracted from [53] 
 
OWASP provides both web and cloud-based threat modeling projects that aim at 
finding possible attack scenarios on systems and what can be done in order to detect 
them or mitigate their impact. Threat Dragon is an online web application that uses data 
flow diagrams to model system behavior and a rule engine to autogenerate threats and 
mitigations following the STRIDE approach. OWASP cloud security project focuses on 
cloud-based products and services security with the use of human-friendly threat model 
templates in simple readme files and control actions in the form of Behavioral Driven 
Development stories. 
 
 
5.4 Diamond model 
 
The Diamond model [53] is one of the main models for cyber intrusion analysis that 
focuses on the intrusion event element rather than using a stepped based approach. It 
consists of for basic elements: adversary, victim, capability and infrastructure which are 
represented in a diamond shape that implies their underlying dependencies. There are 
also some meta-features included that are used to link events together into activity 
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groups forming an extensive model of suspicious activity. It is a flexible model that 
captures adversary actions, able to be extended with new ideas. 
 
Core definitions: An event is a discrete time activity requiring external resources, that 
an adversary executes against a victim using a capability over some infrastructure. Each 
event has core and meta features as described earlier and a confidence value, a function 
which may vary in different model scenarios. An adversary is the one responsible for 
using a capability against a victim. Adversaries include insiders, outsiders and 
organizations that launch attacks for personal gain. Capability describes the tools of the 
adversary that are used during an event. Capacity is the set of vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited by an adversary capability. The sum of the tools used by an attacker, from the 
simplest to the most sophisticated one constitute the adversary’s arsenal. Infrastructure 
refers to the physical and logical communication between the victim and the adversary 
during the capability usage. Infrastructure is divided to type 1 that is fully controlled by 
the attacker, type 2 that is controlled by an intermediary and can be useful for 
obfuscation purposes and service providers for the communication of type 1 and 2 
infrastructures. Victim is the target of the attacker and can be described either as a 
person, organization, industry or as an asset like a network system and an IP address. 
Vulnerabilities that concern a specific target form the susceptibilities of the victim and 
are expressed in plain text or in a formal common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE) 
form. 
 
 
 
Figure 21 Diamond model overview, extracted from [53] 
 
 
Meta-features: These are non-critical but important events that can help in a better 
description of the model. They can be dynamically defined or extended by the user 
needs. Typical examples are: Timestamps, which refer to the time or date of the incident 
and can be moments or durations of malicious activity. Phases or chain of events that a 
malicious activity can be broken down into. Phases can be actions like host scanning 
discovery, reconnaissance and exploitation. Results report the condition after the attack 
and are useful for determining its success rate. There are several ways that they can be 
defined such as the success, failure and unknown triplet or confidentiality, integrity and 
availability compromise. Direction is a feature that can be primarily used for the flow of 
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network based events and is essential for the decision of countermeasures and detection 
actions. Methodology is used to describe the kind of malicious activity like a port scan 
or a spear phishing e-mail. There are many related formal studies like the Snort class 
types. Resources are all the supporting elements that core and meta-features really onto. 
Examples include software, hardware, knowledge and information. Meta-features are 
not limited to the aforementioned and can be adapted to each scenario for a better grasp 
of the model. 
 
 
5.5 Kill Chain model 
 
Kill chain [55] is a phase-based systematic process that describes the stages of an attack. 
As a military term it was defined as a multi-step process of find, fix, track, target, 
engage and assess (F2T2EA). The main concept behind the model term is that the closer 
to the beginning of the chain an attack can be stopped, the better in terms of cost and 
time it will be. It is also applied in the cyber security sector accordingly also providing a 
countermeasure framework. The cyber intrusion kill chain is a seven-step process which 
will be described below: 
 
Reconnaissance: this is the information gathering process that an attacker executes 
before an attack. Common sources include web crawlers, mailing lists, social media. 
Many passive reconnaissance tools exist on the internet that hold information useful for 
attackers such as search engines for connected devices on the internet, IP addresses, 
domains and website data. Active tools can be used to extract more information on 
identified targets.  
 
Weaponization: the selection of appropriate tools and the creation of the malicious 
payload that will be sent to the victim. Data found from reconnaissance step such OS 
flavor, server types and services are essential for the malware type selection. It could be 
a trojan behind an executable file that gives remote access to the attacker or a spear-
phishing attack to gain access to restricted information. 
 
Delivery: The act of transmission of the weapons to the target environment through 
some means of communication. The most popular ways to deliver payloads are email 
attachments, websites and USB removable. 
 
Exploitation: This phase starts when the victim has downloaded the payload in his 
computer. The payload targets a service or application that has a certain vulnerability 
and executes code. This is a crucial phase because the chain can be killed if the payload 
is not downloaded. 
 
Installation: The execution of the payload either manually by the victim or 
automatically. This is also an important step for the adversary to maintain persistence in 
the target environment. Manual execution means that the chain can be broken if the 
payload is not executed. 
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Command and control: Compromised hosts connect to a controller server and wait for 
instructions. In this phase the attacker has successfully gained access in the target 
environment. 
 
Actions on objectives: The final step, when the adversary has already access on the 
targeted system, is to take actions to achieve the objective of the attack. This includes 
collecting, encrypting or extracting information from the victim. Other objectives 
include attacks against integrity and availability. The target could also be used as an 
intermediary point to compromise additional systems. 
 
 
 
Figure 22 the 7-step process of killchain model, extracted from [54] 
 
Based on the previous, kill chain is divided into two main phases that correspond to the 
left and right part of the exploit. The left part includes the reconnaissance, 
weaponization and delivery phases and understanding its’ patterns is of great 
importance for cyber defense. The adversary then waits for the victims’ response, 
whose decision will be crucial for the right part phases and the delivery of the exploit. 
Some attacks follow their own rules by skipping or adding extra steps. Zero-day 
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exploits and newly discovered vulnerabilities often mean that we move to the right part 
of the chain which requires instant incident response and patch deployment. 
 
 
5.6 Combining models 
 
Modeling methods can be combined to give a better view both from the adversary’s and 
the target system’s perspective. ARENA [56] discrete-event simulation model, creates a 
virtual network that generates representative cyber-attack and intrusion alert data, 
creating scenarios based on a combination modeling approach. The first concept is a kill 
switch variation that models hackers’ typical actions into 10 stages, as a sequence of 
events. The first five stages (Reconnaissance, intrusion user, escalation, intrusion root, 
DoS,) represent actions on external machines while the five last (enumeration, intrusion 
user, escalation, intrusion root, goal pilfering) on internal. The second concept includes 
graphs that show both the progression of cyber-attacks and the representation of their 
structure. Parameters included are goals, targets and other attack related terms. A logic 
diagram helps with attack generation by choosing legitimate attackers, victims and the 
possible ways they can penetrate the network. 
 
 
5.7 Attack models on CPS 
 
Critical infrastructures such as the power grid have become an attractive target for 
attackers that can may put integrity of operations and human safety at risk. Therefore, 
cyber security is now an integral part of CPS and many modeling scenarios have been 
proposed for a better analysis of their consequences. 
 
[57] Provides a categorization on CPS based attacks to conventional and cross-domain 
ones. Stuxnet like attacks that crossed the cyber-physical domain boundary played a big 
part in the proposed model structure which provides a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of the attacks. It is based on the existing classifications of cyber-attacks with 
single or multi-dimension properties giving an emphasis to cross-domain features. 
 
The main terms are: The target group which includes both influenced elements directly 
affected and the influence that describes what is changed on the target element, the 
effects group that includes the victim element and the impact on victim (terms 
equivalent to the target group subparts that may belong to different domains) and the 
attack group which consists of the means that made it successful and the preconditions 
required. The subtle distinction between influenced and victim elements allows for a 
division of the attacks to four categories based on whether they belong to the cyber or 
physical domain.  
The proposed method can be used in several application areas such as documentation 
and analysis, by providing a formal representation of attack on CPS, vulnerability 
assessment by utilizing attack means, influenced elements and preconditions for an 
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attack to be successful and better attack propagation and impact assessment with the 
help of the cyber and physical categorization scheme. 
 
[58] uses the attack vector model to identify all possible security holes on SCADA, 
discusses the system protection infrastructure in CPS, examining a SCADA and 
communication network scenario under a malware injection, a DoS and a MITM attack. 
Netlogo, a multi-agent modeling environment is used to help with the malware injection 
occurrence in the corporate network and ns2 to compute the results of the DoS and 
MITM attack. 
 
 
5.8 Attack models on Smart Grid 
 
[59] aware of the complicated, large-scale nature of Critical infrastructure systems such 
as the smart grid, combines system theory and the cyber world to follow a cross-domain 
like taxonomy of attacks. Attacks and consequences are therefore classified into four 
categories depending on whether they affect cyber or physical components of the 
system. Based on the main three security principles, confidentiality of power related 
data, integrity of software and control commands and attacks against availability of 
services are the main requirements for a secure smart grid environment. Attack stages 
include the exploit of one or more entry points (network holes, backdoors, external 
devices, insiders) and the attackers actions and consequences after the successful 
compromise of an entry point (false data injection, database access, denial of service). 
Consequences included belong both to the cyber and physical domains. 
 
 
 
Figure 23 Attack taxonomy and threat classification, extracted from [59] 
 
 
[60] comprehends a study about the attack surface of the AMI with an implied aim to 
provide effective cybersecurity countermeasures. AMI provides sensitive information 
about power grid parameters, billing prices and can be utilized by consumers to perform 
power control actions. According to the paper the main attack domains include denial of 
power service to a consumer, theft of power from utilities and disruption of the grid. 
The study separates the AMI attack surface into three main categories: 
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Smart meters are the main component of the AMI which gather power and billing 
related data and can connect or disconnect an end user to the power grid. Potential 
attack vectors are wireless network, attacks to the communication radios and attacks on 
serial links through physical access to the meters. Smart meters are based on low-cost 
components which can lead to more security concerns. 
 
The ICT network which connects smart meters and data concentrators together, with the 
HAN and with the utilities WAN is another entry point. Common vulnerabilities in 
ZigBee or WiFi protocols can give network access to an attacker. HAN side 
compromise could further allow an attacker to remotely control smart appliances due to 
the shared interface with the home computers.  
 
Vulnerabilities against commonly used protocols (TCP, UDP, IPv6) and software also 
provide a sum of possible attack vectors. 
[61] provides a framework in order to estimate the level of susceptibility of the smart 
grid infrastructure to attacks. An integration with NIST risk framework is used to 
provide more accurate results. The model is based on terms like privileges, which is 
access to specific parts of the system, information objects which constitute primary 
target points, attackers and security common mechanisms. A stride-based data flow 
diagram is used to give a graphical overview of the model. 
 
The exposure diagram is an arc connected relationship between the main terms of the 
model through the possible attack paths. The graph development begins by suspicious 
information flow attacker identification. Each attacker requires an amount of effort, 
represented by a number, to bypass a security mechanism and gain a set of privileges 
that can finally give him access to targeted information objects. 
 
 
 
Figure 24 proposed framework, extracted from [61] 
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6 Analysis of cyber-attack 
modeling in smart grid 
related frameworks 
This section comprehends the most considerable up to date efforts of cyber-attack 
modeling in smart grid infrastructure sub-domains. Albeit smart grid modeling has been 
achieved with many different combinations of the tools mentioned in the previous 
sections, the attempts for cyber-attack related models are minimal and currently 
undergoing research. In those efforts however, the proposed frameworks have followed 
both co-simulation approaches combining both power and communication networks for 
impact evaluation, and emulation approaches using virtualized software and/or real 
hardware to interact and experiment with the system in real time. 
 
6.1 ASTORIA 
 
ASTORIA [62] (Attack Simulation TOolset for smart gRid InfrAstractures) is a co-
simulation framework that uses mosaik and its integrated simulators to model the power 
grid elements combined with the ns3 simulator for the ICT equipment. It enables 
simulation of cyber-attacks by providing a set of built in profiles that correspond to 
different attack scenarios. 
 
6.1.1 Mosaik overview 
 
Mosaik framework provides a demo which is a good starting point and with simple code 
changes can be adapted to the user needs. The main script includes the configuration 
parameters for the simulators used, the scenario and the actual run of the co-simulation. 
Json or xls files are used to define the grid parameters that will be passed to PyPower 
and csv files for the production and consumption profiles. 
We modify the json script that corresponds to the power grid topology to create a 
scenario with 3 households, 1 photovoltaic panel, 1 windmill generator, 1 electric 
vehicle profiles, all connected to a transformer and a reference to the upper power grid. 
The script includes the required transformer, buses, branches and their interconnection 
that PyPower will use to solve the flow of the model. 
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Figure 25 Grid Topology 
 
In the main script, after importing mosaik and other required modules we define the 
simulators we want to include, with the required parameters. They are used by default 
from mosaik and include PyPower, a HouseholdSim used to model residual load 
consumption profiles, a CSV simulator that models the profiles of renewable energy 
resources and the electric vehicle, the database used by mosaik to store simulation data 
and the mosaik web visualization simulator. 
 
  
Figure 26 Simulation configuration and scenario definition 
 
Useful simulation parameters and profiles are stored into local variables and will be 
used to build the scenario. The main function creates a mosaik world using the 
configuration we defined earlier, creates the scenario which will be displayed in the web 
browser until we tell it to stop. 
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Figure 27 main function and profile parameters 
 
The rest of the code includes the connection between simulation entities and the web 
visualization parameters. Executing the script starts the simulation and opens up a 
browser window where simulation entities and their parameters can be explored. We 
changed a bit the CSS code in the web visualization simulator to separate between the 
entities. 
 
 
 
Figure 28 Simulation execution and web browser visualization 
 
Figure 29 Load profiles of a household and an electric vehicle 
 
 
Mosaik also provides an easy to use GUI called Maverig where we can easily drag and 
drop the previous scenario. Many simulators are already predefined. It also supports the 
integration of new ones and provides built in consumption and production profiles. 
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Figure 30 Maverig simulation and load profile diagrams 
6.1.2 NS-3 
 
 
To model a communication network, Ns-3 uses built in classes that represent internet 
core concepts. Node class refers to computing devices, application class is used to 
generate simulated activity, channel class is equivalent to the media that information 
flows through, net device class enables the communication between nodes (NICs) and 
topology helpers coordinate the common connection tasks required. 
  
As smart grid power grid systems are network connected we can use ns-3 to simulate 
the behavior of the communication counterpart. Consumers and renewable energy 
resources be represented by sensors nodes that send power grid related data to RTUs 
located in system buses. RTUs normally send gathered data to an MTU, the only part of 
the network simulation that doesn’t have a power grid pair. 
 
After importing the required ns3 modules we create the ns-3 node objects that 
figuratively correspond to the RTUs (client), MTU (server) and the consumers 
(sensors). The internetstackhelper helps in installing TCP, UDP, IP and other internet 
related parameters to the nodes.  Based on the topology two sensors will be placed in 
each client and all clients will be star connected to the server node. 
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Figure 31 Network topology and node creation 
 
 
Using the corresponding point to point topology helpers with create the channels enable 
the communication with the net device and assign IP addresses to both sensor-client and 
client-server channels. The rest of the code generates application layer simulated 
activity and runs the simulation. 
 
 
Figure 32 Channel creation and IP addressing 
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6.1.3 ASTORIA Co-simulation 
 
ASTORIA is based on the integration of mosaik’s power related simulators to ns-3. The 
previous scenario is based on the exchange of simple TCP packets between the nodes. 
ASTORIA took advantage of the extensibility of ns-3 to develop SCADA related 
communication protocols like Modbus and DNP3 and the behavior of MTU, RTU and 
field devices, features not previously available within ns-3 framework. 
 
Ns3 topology is passed to mosaik through an xml file using the networkx package for its 
creation and configuration. Mosaik handles simulation execution, the connection 
between them, it matches simulation components and forwards power grid related data 
to the communication network. Using the simulator manager, the mosaik-api connects 
to a running ns-3 instance to a predefined host:port pair in simulation configuration 
description. Scenario parameters for ns-3 are configured in the scenario creation 
function in the main mosaik script. 
 
 
Figure 33 Astoria framework architecture, extracted from [62] 
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6.1.4 Attacks 
 
ASTORIA makes use of an attack surface like technique as a cyber-attack modeling 
guide. The topology of the system is mapped by SCADA systems, field devices and the 
communication network, which constitute a modern smart grid environment. Power grid 
legacy components, their connection to the internet and the common protocols adopted 
and their vulnerabilities are enough to give an overview of the possible paths that an 
adversary can take to compromise or gain access to a smart grid network device. Main 
attacks supported are DoS attacks against SCADA devices, man in the middle attacks 
and false data injection by modifying sensor measurements 
 
 
Figure 34 Attacks supported by Astoria, extracted from [62] 
 
Two attacks evaluated by ASTORIA team with an outer purpose of evaluating the 
impact on operational and financial losses. The first is a malware injection simulation 
by adding a component that changes the actual sensor measurement data sent to the 
MTU to a 10% of the actual consumption. The second is a buffer overflow due to a DoS 
attack that stops RTUs from sampling sensor related data. A small input queue was 
implemented to RTU simulated components based on an actual buffer overflow 
vulnerability in SCADA systems reported in 2014. 
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Figure 35 RTUs stop their operation after DoS attack, extracted from [62] 
 
6.2 NeSSi2 
 
[63] represents a distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack against a real like 
simulated smart grid topology consisting of smart meters, power plants and utility 
servers. The paper focuses on the AMI nature of the smart grid and specifically on 
smart meters and the vulnerabilities introduced due to the power and ICT integration. 
An attack surface like technique that focuses on AMI and IT is followed here, rendering 
hardware (smart meters, RTUs), software (protocols), networks and the possible 
exploitation of their vulnerabilities as the possible attack vectors. NeSSi2 is used to 
evaluate the results of a large-scale DoS attack of multiple coordinated attack sources 
that exploits common Internet vulnerabilities. 
Before diving into the actual simulation process the paper provides an overview of the 
real aspects of a DDoS attack. The main categories of are briefly mentioned. These are 
SYN, ICMP and UDP flooding that exploit the three-way-handshake, configuration 
errors in network devices and the simplicity of UDP packets correspondingly to waste 
network resources and attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in network protocols or 
software to disrupt service normality. Finally, widely used tools in real DDoS examples 
like Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) and its upgraded version HOIC are briefly 
explained. 
The NeSSi2 scenario simulates a UDP flooding DDOS attack by sending a large 
number of UDP packets to random ports on the victim host. The victim is forced to send 
ICMP replies for those packets rendering it unreachable to legitimate requests. Spoofing 
the source IP address provides anonymity and ensures that ICMP replies do not flood 
the attacker. 
The energy network consists of a real life adopted scenario that includes five low 
voltage sub networks of 1kV. Each network follows an open ring topology that can be 
isolated in fault cases and consists of 10 households running a smart home application. 
Respectively, the IP network consists of five sub-networks with 10 hosts that represent 
the ICT part of the smart grid. 
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Figure 36 Energy subnetwork and IP network in NeSSi2, extracted from [63] 
 
 
In order to perform a DDoS attack on the utility server, it is connected to a bot network 
that consists of zombie hosts controlled by the attacker that will be used to 
anonymously send large volumes of data to the server victim. The NeSSi2 profiles used 
are client and server which run standard UDP and energy failure applications and a bot 
profile that runs the DDoS application. 
 
 
 
Figure 37 The bot network, extracted from [63] 
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The simulation runs for the default NeSSi2 duration of 1000 discrete time units. The 
DDoS attack is set to start at tick 300 and at tick 500 the server starts dropping all 
incoming packets. The energy produced is equal to the requirements sent by the utility 
server and the lack of data results in a stop of electricity production by the power plant. 
 
 
 
Figure 38 power plant halts after DDoS attack, extracted from [63] 
 
6.3 SCORE 
 
6.3.1 Overview 
 
Smart-Grid Common Open Research Emulator (SCORE) [64], based on CORE, is the 
first attempt to emulate an integrated power and communication network. Its main 
purpose is to provide a middle ground between a real testbed and a co-simulator that can 
be easily ported to real smart grid devices. Its main features are: fidelity with the use of 
both power and communication modules, portability of the virtual nodes that run the 
smart grid applications to real systems and scalability due to distributed emulation 
capabilities. 
 
Score is based on CORE’s structure providing additional modules and configurations 
for the power grid. The session related daemon, related services, virtual nodes and 
network configuration parameters are started using the GUI. Emulated nodes are 
individual virtual or real device instances that either way represent smart grid 
applications that one can interact with through a Linux like shell. 
  
The communication network emulation inherits all CORE characteristics allowing 
virtualized nodes to be connected to physical devices. Power flows, loads, renewable 
energy sources are also implemented through SCORE power module, which also 
handles grid topology, configurations and is updated through interactions with the 
communication network. 
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Figure 39 SCORE architecture, extracted from [64] 
 
 
6.3.2 Attacks on a SCORE emulator 
 
In [65] SCORE is used in a testbed capable of being extended with cyber-attack 
execution capabilities. The testbed consists of two Linux virtual machines, an Ubuntu 
that serves as the target machine that runs the smart grid emulation and a Kali Linux 
penetration testing platform that corresponds to the attacker. 
 
A typical SCORE smart grid scenario consists of a power plant and a number of houses 
represented by an intelligent switch that different nodes are attached to. These can be 
loads, storage devices or renewable energy resources. 
 
After downloading and installing CORE and SCORE, we start the score-daemon, 
navigate to the folder where score is stored and start the GUI. 
 
 
 
Figure 40 Starting score 
 
Scoreplus comes up with some predefined imn topologies. One of them is a smart grid 
scenario with six houses with an intelligent switch in each one, all connected to a solar 
panel, a wind turbine, two loads and a storage device. Nodes can be connected through 
power (red) or link (green) ethernet lines depending on their type and the scenario 
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needs. Main configurations and services are automatically handled by SCORE. We add 
to the scenario a power supply and a GRE tunnel connection to one of the nodes that 
will allow us to connect the attacker with the target system. 192.168.1.152 is the IP of 
the CORE host, 192.168.1.153 the IP of Kali Linux and 10.0.2.2 the IP it gets when we 
tunnel it to the emulation network. 
 
 
 
Figure 41 SCORE scenario 
 
 
Figure 42 GRE tunnel setup 
 
 
DoS attack 
 
Using Kali Linux as the attack platform means that a kill chain model approach is 
followed. Nmap GUI is used as a reconnaissance tool to gather information about the 
smart grid network. We limit the IP range to those needed in order to dramatically 
reduce execution time. Scan results include an IP address list of live hosts and a short 
description of them, open ports, services and a topology related graph of the network. 
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Figure 43 Zenmap results 
 
 
For the weaponization process, the tool used was a free packet generator and analyzer 
for TCP/IP protocol called hping3. The following command sends to the power supply 
100000 SYN packets with a window size of 64 and a size of 120 to port 2601 
discovered by Nmap as fast as possible without waiting for replies in flood mode. We 
also use rand source to hide the source IP address. 
 
 
 
Figure 44 DoS with hping3 
 
During the SYN flood attack the throughput jumps to extremely high values as the 
attacker sends packets repeatedly. As the victim tries to respond and the attacker doesn’t 
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close down the connection an overflow of half-open three-way handshakes is created 
that can deny the service to other nodes due to network congestion. We can see that 
when we try to ping the target during the DoS attack a high percentage of the packet is 
lost or even the target host is unreachable. 
 
 
Figure 45 High throughput during SYN flood 
 
 
Figure 46 Ping during attack 
 
MITM suggestion 
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A man in the middle attack is also a network-based attack that could be performed in 
the previous smart grid scenario. The purpose of this attack is often to fool the victim 
into associating the MAC address of the default gateway with the attackers MAC 
address in order to intercept and modify the traffic meant for it. A common example in 
smart grid is the capture and modification of meter data from RTU gateways to control 
centers. As SCORE doesn’t provide any SCADA emulation software and traffic here is 
a simple analogy between a gateway and a host victim. 
 
We enable packet forwarding in the network system processes for our Kali Linux 
machine to let it act as a router. We set up arpspoof to capture traffic received and sent 
traffic and send it to the attacker machine and display the sniffed ICMP echo packets 
with tcpdump. 
 
 
Figure 47 ARP spoofing attack 
 
 
6.4 GNS3 
 
6.4.1 Modeling approach 
 
In [66] a DoS attack against a smart grid communication network modeled environment 
is studied. The paper focuses on PMUs and the measurement data they continuously 
send to PDCs for synchronization, monitor and control of the power grid in real time. A 
combination of an attack surface and a kill chain model is followed here. The former 
identifies all the possible attack vectors on PMUs and generally on wide area 
monitoring systems and the latter helps in appropriate selection of attack tools. 
Synchrophasor networks vulnerabilities vary from physical, denial of service to 
malicious data injection, data spoofing and man in the middle attacks. The tools used 
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are GNS3 network emulator, openPDC, an open source packet data concentrator along 
with the PMU connection tester to send PMU sample data between hosts and Low Orbit 
Ion Cannon (LOIC), a tool that is commonly used for Denial of Service attacks. 
 
 
6.4.2 DoS with GNS3 
 
The following model is a simplified variation of the aforementioned paper, that is used 
to evaluate a DoS attack against a smart grid communication network environment. 2 
VMWare virtual hosts with 2 separate virtual NICs are used and connected to a 
simplified network topology through the GNS3 emulator. The hosts are 2 windows 
machines that will use the OpenPDC and the PMU connection packet tester. The 
network includes typical bandwidth and delays in ethernet and serial links. Switches and 
hosts are default GNS3 appliances and routers are a c3725 cisco router image. 
 
 
 
Figure 48 Network topology 
 
All router interfaces are configured, both dynamically and manually where needed and 
the hosts default gateways are changed to match the corresponding router in the GNS3 
network. A simple routing protocol is also configured to announce all the possible IPs in 
the network. Host 1 has an IP of 192.168.164.129 and host 192.168.52.129. The main 
differences between the paper and this model is that the paper used a more complex ISP 
routing topology and GNS3 marketplace appliances instead of the default cloud 
appliance that was used here for the hosts. The logic however remains the same. 
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Figure 49 Configuration of router interfaces connected to hosts 
 
 
 
Figure 50 Configuration of ISP related serial interfaces 
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Figure 51 Host configuration 
 
 
Low Orbit Ion cannon is used to execute a Denial of Service attack to Host 2. Its use is 
pretty simple by providing a target IP address and a TCP flood as the method of the 
attack. The flow of the TCP packets which can be observed below, causes huge 
latencies to the PMU data transmission and can even render the victim unreachable by 
the network, which is unacceptable for the demand and response and the continuous 
availability of the power grid services. Sample data used by PMU connection tester 
where both old IEEE 1344-1995 and their replacement C37.118-2005 standards for 
synchrophasors for power systems. 
 
 
Figure 52 LOIC 
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Figure 53 Data sent with the PMU connection tester 
 
 
Figure 54 TCP flood results 
 
6.4.3 Hexinject 
 
Hexinject is a packet sniffer and injector that comes built in with Kali Linux. It can be 
used to sniff and display packets in raw or hexadecimal format on the specified 
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interfaces. It can be also used to inject and modify network traffic by replacing 
hexadecimal values of intercepted packets. The basic usage of the tool is shown in the 
figure below. 
 
 
 
Figure 55 Hexinject usage 
 
A compromised node or a weakness in network encryption mechanisms that has often 
been observed in many known attacks, renders network traffic susceptible to sniffing 
and modification. A simple Hexinject command is used to change the legitimate 
destination IP address of the PMU data preventing them from reaching the PDC. 
Wireshark usage confirms that the packets have indeed been modified. 
 
 
Figure 56 data spoofing with hexinject 
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Figure 57 data spoofing with hexinject 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
This section included a brief look on the most considerable modeling techniques on 
smart grid networks. The proposed frameworks included both co-simulation 
(ASTORIA, NeSSi2) and emulation (SCORE, GNS3) approaches. ASTORIA and 
SCORE were tested in an Ubuntu environment while NeSSi2 and GNS3 on a Windows 
10 host. GNS3 is the most versatile tool and can be used in most common operating 
systems. The co-simulation approaches provide both power and communication 
network components within their frameworks. ASTORIA uses mosaik and its integrated 
simulators to simulate power grid features and to synchronize them with the NS3 
simulator, used for the ICT components. NeSSi2 has its own built in power and network 
simulators, implemented through a structured method on the frontend GUI and running 
as backend processes. Emulators follow an alternate approach. SCORE uses built in 
power modules for the power grid components and CORE virtualized network 
architecture for the ICT part. GNS3 scenario used external software to send sample 
PMU data between hosts through networks modeled with pre-included or installed 
appliances. ASTORIA tested a variety of attacks including malicious software, DoS, 
eavesdropping, sniffing while the other tools focused on DoS. Man-in-the-middle and 
data spoofing was also shown to be a possible scenario. Simulators used built-in 
(NeSSi2) or manually defined (ASTORIA) components as attack tools while emulators 
focused on tools of Kali Linux penetration testing platform. GNS3 scenario also 
included windows hosts that ran LOIC and PMU data software. Simulators test area was 
the distribution power grid, SCORE attempted an attack on a wind generator and GNS3 
on PMUs that are located in both transmission and distribution power grid. Simulators 
evaluate the impact of the attack by running the scenario while emulators allow for real 
time interaction with the modeled network. Attack surface prevailed as the modeling 
technique along with the kill chain model approach in the emulation scenarios that was 
necessary for the appropriate attack tool selection. GNS3 project seems to be having the 
best support among the platforms and SCORE the lowest as it has been abandoned by 
its founders. The table below provides an overview of this section highlights. 
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Simulator 
/Attribute 
ASTORIA NeSSi2 SCORE GNS3 
Type Co-simulation Co-simulation Emulation Emulation 
OS Ubuntu Linux Windows Ubuntu Linux Windows/Linux/iOS 
Power compo-
nents 
Mosaik simula-
tors 
Built in discrete 
simulators 
SCORE power 
modules 
PMU/PDC software 
Network com-
ponents 
NS3 
Built in discrete 
simulators 
CORE virtual ma-
chines 
GNS3 appliances 
Attacks tested 
Malicious soft-
ware/DoS/ 
Eavesdropping 
DDoS 
DoS/ARP spoof-
ing 
DoS/data spoofing 
Tools used Attack profiles DoS appliance Hping/arpspoof 
LOIC/hexinject/ 
OpenPDC/PMU 
connection tester 
External/virtual 
components 
˟ ˟ 
Kali Linux/GRE 
tunnel 
Kali Linux/windows 
VMWare hosts 
License Open source Open source Open source Open source 
Grid test area Distribution Distribution Generation 
Transmission/ 
Distribution 
Scalability High Medium/High Medium Medium 
Evaluation By impact By impact 
Real time inter-
action 
Real time interac-
tion 
Modeling tech-
niques 
Attack surface Attack surface Kill chain 
Kill chain/attack sur-
face 
Support Medium Low None High 
Language Python/C++ Java Python Python 
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7 Conclusions 
The smart grid is an integrated power and communication network infrastructure with 
an ideal of efficient use of renewable energy resources, real time monitor and 
automation, demand response strategies and billing participation of the consumers. The 
use of standard communication protocols however, albeit the conveniences it may offer, 
poses also a great threat by introducing the common vulnerabilities of the ICT 
infrastructure. This thesis included an overview of the smart grid power and network 
architecture indicating its main security issues. The complex nature of the smart grid 
ecosystem sparked interest for simulation attempts. An overview of both co-simulation 
and emulation platforms was consequently described with an eye towards security 
related modeling attempts. To model, understand and mitigate a cyber-attack in an 
efficient way, the main cyber-attack modeling techniques where subsequently 
mentioned. The last section included an analysis of the most considerable efforts up to 
date, to model a cyberattack against smart grid networks, both on co-simulation and 
emulation, an overview of their tools and some extra possible attacks scenarios. Being 
one of the critical infrastructures smart grid cybersecurity is an important factor that 
both simulation and emulation approaches can provide useful information on past 
incident analysis and future attack avoidance and mitigation strategies. 
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